IMEMO Head — RBC: “Trump is Playing a Complex Combination”

In an interview with RBC, IMEMO RAS DIRECTOR Fyodor Voytolovsky told what awaits Ukraine after the squabble in the White House, what goals Trump is actually pursuing in foreign policy, and whether he wants to expand the United States at the expense of CANADA and Greenland. Fyodor Voytolovsky

— Everyone saw the conversation between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, which took place in front of journalists and was conducted in raised tones. How can you explain the position of the US administration regarding the conflict in Ukraine?

— We should not confuse the public presentation of the political process with reality. I think that Trump is playing a rather complex foreign policy combination. In 2014, Barack Obama distanced himself from the MINSK agreements, making the peaceful settlement in Donbas a problem for RUSSIA and the EU . At that time, the Ukrainian leadership perceived this unequivocally — as a carte blanche to ignore the peace process and to continue using force against the DPR and LPR. Eight years later, the leaders of France and Germany openly said that their goal was to mislead Russia and buy time to strengthen Ukraine's military potential.

Trump's conversation with Zelensky showed that the US President wants to reduce funding for Kiev's military policy at the expense of American taxpayers, but at the same time, at this stage, he would like to remove from himself the political risks associated with his declared active role in the process of political and diplomatic settlement. He has already promised to solve the problem of achieving peace in the shortest possible time. However, ending such a long-term conflict requires long and nuanced negotiations, including a large number of issues - military, political, territorial, humanitarian.

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By criticizing Zelensky for his reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table with the Russian leadership, Trump, on the one hand, shows that it is Kiev that really does not want a settlement, and on the other hand, he removes responsibility for military support for Ukraine from himself and the United States, shifting it entirely to the Europeans. After all, the EU countries, by showing support for the Kiev regime, will naturally assume greater responsibility for military support for Kiev. The European members of NATO are thus tasked with continuing the indirect confrontation with Russia in Ukraine . And the United States will be able to wait for a more favorable moment for its involvement in the diplomatic process as an arbitrator.

The benefits of this situation for Russia, which has repeatedly declared its readiness for a political and diplomatic end to the conflict, but with firm guarantees on a wider range of security issues, are not obvious. Perhaps, there is only one thing in favor of Russia's position - an alternative view of the Ukrainian conflict has appeared in the West, and part of public opinion and the positions of American elites are definitely not with Kiev.

— How do you think the foreign policy priorities of the second Trump administration have changed compared to the first?

— The foreign policy priorities of the second Trump administration will become clear only after the publication of the updated National Security Strategy, which is not expected until the end of this year or the beginning of next year. Until then, there will be a “zeroing in” — a search for priorities and the identification of key areas.

Trump returned to the White House much better prepared in terms of understanding how international policy is made, what he needs from a domestic political standpoint, and what America needs from an economic standpoint.

The new administration's foreign policy looks extremely pragmatic and economically centric. There are loud statements like "give us Greenland" or "we want the Panama Canal back." But what the Trump administration's foreign policy will really focus on will be revealed in the next year and a half. The first 100 days in the White House certainly set the tone, but they do not give a complete picture of the long-term strategy.

— What is most important for the new administration at this stage?

— Relations with our neighbors, Mexico and Canada, will be very important, especially from an economic point of view. These two countries are key trading partners for the United States: they are both sources of resources and markets. Therefore, what happens in these countries is important to Trump. He is the president who apparently wants to turn America back to the Western Hemisphere, and what happens in Argentina, Brazil and other major economies in the region will also be of significant importance to his presidency.

Like his predecessor Biden, relations with CHINA are extremely important to Trump. He will conduct a very tough bargaining for the terms of interaction in the trade and economic sphere - squeezing Chinese competitors of American companies out of the US market through tariffs. At the same time, the Trump administration is aimed at strategic military and political containment of China  - there is no difference in this from the Democrats' course. The main question is to what extent the US leadership will be ready to agree to the separation of economies (decoupling) and what conditions and development restrictions will it impose on Beijing in trade, finance, investment and technology. Much will depend on what positions Chinese companies can get in the global value chains integrated by American companies, and from where the Americans will try to throw them out.

It is already obvious today that the US will push Chinese suppliers and partners out of those sectors where they can gain access to promising innovations and dual-use technologies: communications, telecommunications in general, microelectronics and, first and foremost, semiconductors, new materials, high-performance computing and methods of working with big data. This will determine the further model of socio-economic development of the US itself - the parameters of reindustrialization and development of human capital, as well as the priorities of industrial policy and innovation strategy.

Trump can create a political or regulatory framework with tariffs, technology restrictions, EXPORT controls and sanctions, but the decisions themselves will be made by American big business. It is important to remember that the United States is heavily dependent on supplies of components and resources from China, including rare earth metals and lithium. How the Trump administration will balance between business interests, on the one hand, and national security considerations and political and ideological priorities, on the other, is an open question. The world has changed a lot since Trump's first presidency. And Trump himself is different: he is a much more experienced and much better prepared president, and he is forming a very interesting team, although in some places quite unconventional.

— Speaking about Trump’s team, what conclusion can be drawn from the fact that many key positions were occupied by people from the world of big capital?

— For many decades, Republicans, when coming to power , traditionally appoint managers, lawyers and negotiators from big business to key government positions. This approach ensures the support of the administration from big capital — American transnational capital, interested in dominating global markets. Trump acts within the framework of this long-standing tradition, forming a team in the logic familiar to Republicans. However, in his case, this is especially noticeable, since he himself is a business man.

Trump has already been president. He understands the interests of corporate capital and the country's tasks well and will try to combine them. At the same time, Trump is a right-wing Republican and is deeply rooted in the traditional coordinate system of domestic and foreign policy priorities of this part of the establishment. Although he declares the need to "clean up the Washington swamp", he himself is closely connected with traditional interest groups that have always supported the Republican Party - fuel and energy companies and the military-industrial complex. Now they have been joined by fintech companies and large investment funds. In this sense, Trump is an absolutely systemic player. At the same time, the experience of the first administration, which included many people from the Pentagon, convinced him that businessmen work more efficiently.

— Both before and especially after his inauguration, Trump has lashed out at Canada, claiming that it only survives thanks to American subsidies and should therefore become the 51st state. How much does he really want to expand the United States?

— This is more of a trade and economic issue. Trump is a supporter of a tough customs and tariff policy. This is already clearly visible in China, against which he is already introducing tariffs. At the same time, China's retaliatory measures look much more restrained and moderate than the steps taken by Washington. Trump is now scaring his allies from the European Union with 25 percent tariffs. This looks like a demanding position.

Same with Canada. Trump knows that Canada is struggling economically and that now is a good time to make noise, scare and demand something for himself. But these are not territorial claims.

This is also a signal to London: who are you with, Great Britain ? Will you follow me the way you used to follow the United States? After all, the HEAD of state in Canada, albeit formally, is not Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, but King Charles III.

— How serious is Trump's proposal that the United States buy the Gaza Strip, evict the Palestinians from there and turn it into an international enclave?

- An unconventional solution and equally fantastic. All this looks very dubious in conditions when the peace process is very fragile.

— Is there a mechanism for such a deal? Everything is clear with the buyer, but who will act as the seller in this case?

— Legally, it is Israel — from the point of view of Israel itself and from the point of view of the United States. From the point of view of the Palestinian Authority government, it is a territory that was governed to a very limited extent by the Palestinian Authority government and the Fatah movement; it was a Hamas stronghold. The Russian Federation recognizes Palestinian statehood, but the United States does not. Trump will definitely take a tough pro-Israel position, as have the right-wing Republicans.

— You mentioned Greenland. How serious is Trump about buying it compared to his first term? And is his ultimate goal really to establish U.S. ownership of the island?

— The Danish kingdom, which exercises control over Greenland, has a long-standing system of agreements with the United States under the bilateral Greenland Security Treaty, allowing Washington to station military installations on the island. The United States has traditionally viewed Greenland as a kind of “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” and during the Cold War it hosted a strategic aviation base and even nuclear weapons. The island currently hosts US airfields and RADAR stations, and has the ability to deploy missile defense systems, space surveillance, naval and anti-submarine systems.

This is military-political logic, and there is economic logic, but it is not obvious there. Yes, Greenland has little-explored reserves of rare earth metals and a number of other types of mineral raw materials. But for them to be profitable, large-scale geological exploration and crazy investors are needed who will invest in this with the risk of unprofitability. But so far I do not see any desire on the part of any large American company to invest in these projects, and therefore I think that military-political, not economic considerations are behind Trump's statements.

The U.S. interest in Greenland predates Trump by two centuries. But for Trump, it is symbolic, demonstrating to his domestic audience his ability to raise such big issues. Meanwhile, calls for independence are growing louder in Greenland, and the Danish government is finding it increasingly difficult to support the population of its largest island and to address the military challenges that come with it.

So Trump is more likely to play along with separatism in Greenland, and then pull it into the United States - and not necessarily as another state. We are not talking about the annexation of Greenland as such, but about possible military-political projects, such as the deployment of medium-range land-based missiles, which can be deployed both with nuclear and non-nuclear equipment, as well as theater missile defense systems, and in the future - strategic ones.

— How do you assess Trump’s statements about his desire to return control over the Panama Canal to the United States?

— The Panama Canal is a much more serious issue, since Trump is clearly not happy with the current status quo, in which the US is deprived of preferences and the ability to regulate shipping through the canal. The new administration is particularly irritated by China’s activity in the region: a Hong Kong company manages the canal’s infrastructure, and Chinese firms own terminals and other facilities.

That is, this is again a question that is primarily connected with the confrontation with China and has both a trade-economic and a military-political dimension. Trump's statements on the Panama Canal are a beautiful statement that the foreign policy of the new administration is taken seriously. But what will happen in the US relations with China and Europe is much more important.

— How will relations with the latter develop?

— It is absolutely obvious that Trump will continue what Biden did — tighten all the bolts and nuts in the system of transatlantic relations and put the Europeans in an emphatically subordinate position. Only Biden did it smiling and politely, while Trump will be stern and rude. This is already de facto happening in the economic sphere.

The Europeans have lost the ability to diversify their energy supplies to their market, and have become dependent on American companies and those Middle Eastern suppliers who depend on the United States. Their dependence on American strategic investment has increased, both in terms of foreign direct investment and portfolio investment.

At the moment, American investments , coming from transnational banks and investment funds, have become the most important for most European economies and leading banks and companies. Their independence was first shaken by the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2011, then by the downturn caused by the covid-19 pandemic , and then by the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, which provoked a voluntary break in energy, trade and investment ties with Russia that were beneficial for the leading EU economies. And Trump will beat European countries with a stick and build them the way he needs.

— How do you assess J.D. Vance’s Munich speech in this context?

— And this is the refraction in the political and ideological sphere of the attitude that is being formed de facto in the economic and military-political spheres. Vance reprimanded the European liberal elite, explaining to them what democracy should be like. It is natural that this happened at the Munich Security Conference. In the military-political sphere, the consolidation of NATO allies and the increase in military spending above 2% of GDP will continue — today, even higher figures are being cited.

Vance's speech in Munich is the same, only in the ideological sphere: stop lecturing us and everyone around you about life, start with yourself. As one famous American diplomat said, the Germans will try to introduce ethics into international relations, but this causes nothing but boring lectures. This blossomed especially wildly when the Democrats were in the White House: they also began to emphasize the moral and ethical, liberal agenda and an ideological view of international relations. And Trump is a man of money and a pragmatist.

Vance also had an appeal to the European right: We, the Republican conservatives, came to power in the United States, and your voice can be louder in Europe, too.

— You link many of Trump’s foreign policy statements and steps to specific economic objectives. But what does this flirtation with the concept of sovereignty say about Donald Trump’s attitude toward where and how interstate borders should be drawn?

— This is not a question of specific borders and sovereignties. This is a question of the rules for regulating international relations. Trump may question the legitimacy of international organizations in the form in which we have them now. This does not mean that Trump will completely withdraw from the UN, although he has already withdrawn from the WHO and the Human Rights Council, and UNESCO is next in line. Trump will continue to strike at the old system of coordinates, in which the United States, although a member of the UN Security Council, has insufficient weight, in terms of his ideas about the place of the United States in the world.

They say that Trump is not a globalist. But Trump is a real globalist, only a hegemonic globalist: there are American interests, and then there is everything else. If he manages to come to an agreement with China, Russia and his allies, he will consider it a good deal. If he fails, he will hit with a sledgehammer until he knocks his opponent into agreeing to his terms of the deal or, on the contrary, he will refuse this or that deal. Trump has been a businessman in terms of ethics and the model of negotiations, and he remains one. Therefore, the issue of state borders will be a more fluid reality for him than for the Democrats, who believed in an abstract world order based on rules. What these rules are, they did not specify and were not very ready to consider the UN Charter as them.

- Then what are his rules?

— Those that are beneficial to the US. America first and “peace through strength.” If we managed to reach an agreement, that’s good. If we didn’t, we’ll break through. This will be Trump’s approach, and he will look for partners and allies who are ready to go down this road with him. And he will force those who don’t want to. Another question is how successful he will be.

Trump has two years to implement radical socio-economic reforms such as immigration reform, to put pressure on Western Hemisphere countries and European allies, and to try to build a new system of relations with China and Russia. In 2026, midterm elections to Congress will take place, and whether the Republicans will retain the majority will largely depend on his first two years in the White House. Therefore, Trump will now invest only in what will bring him domestic political and financial-economic dividends.

— How will the US withdrawal from UN agencies and the revision of their funding affect its activities?

— Trump can weaken it significantly. The United States is one of the key sponsors of the UN, accounting for 22% of its budget. The organization's headquarters are not in Geneva or Vienna, although it has representative offices there, but in New York, and the UN Deputy Secretary General is always a US citizen. Finally, the United States is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. And Trump is pragmatic and will not give up this instrument. The fact that a week ago the United States was able to find a common language with Russia and China when adopting UN Security Council Resolution 2774 on the need to end the conflict in Ukraine, which Great Britain and France abstained from adopting, says a lot.

The Trump administration will decide on the amount of funding for the UN depending on how well the UN allows the United States and the American president himself to accomplish their tasks.

— Could a second Trump presidency speed up the redrawing of the world map?

— This process has been going on since 1989 — and at a fairly rapid pace. The Helsinki system, which was formed as a result of the final act of the Helsinki Conference and assumed the inviolability of borders at least in Europe, no longer exists. Where is Czechoslovakia? Where is Yugoslavia? Look at what happened to the Soviet Union and the fragmentation that is now happening to Syria, and before that to Libya and Iraq.

The map of Eastern Europe is changing before our eyes. What will happen to Ukraine? In what form will it end the current conflict, which has been going on since 2014 and which is also connected with the change of the borders of this state? I would not say that this process will accelerate. It is ongoing and in a number of areas it is not finished. Take the South Caucasus - I think this is not the end yet from the point of view of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.

— Could the next big conflict of the century begin in Asia – over Taiwan?

— The Chinese are very pragmatic and will try to resolve the Taiwan issue primarily by economic and information methods. They are in no hurry. I think that the Chinese government is not considering forceful solutions now, but the military must always be ready for them. The Americans understand this well — they are trying to control the development of the situation in relations between Beijing and Taipei by economic, political and military means, increasing their own potential presence in the region and supplying weapons to Taiwan.

— Does the Trump administration benefit from defending Taiwan?

— The Trump administration will benefit from what will benefit American big capital and what will allow the economic and technological development of China and its expansion to be slowed down. If it is possible to use the Taiwan issue in order to focus all of China's political, economic and other resources on solving this problem, then the Americans will try to do everything for this.

This is a standard management technique: create a conflict at the borders and a potentially explosive situation that will draw away resources needed for development. If the Americans understand that the game is not worth the candle and that China will not go for broke, but will wait 20-30 years, as in the case of Hong Kong, then that is one story. But if the Chinese, which I seriously doubt, want to solve the Taiwan issue right here and now, then the Americans will be happy to create a big problem for them there.

— How prepared is the US for a direct confrontation with China?

— In various editions of the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy of all administrations, starting with Barack Obama, it is stated that the main military adversary of the United States in the long term is the PRC, and this is the basis for the American logic of military construction and the formation of the military budget: here is the enemy, to contain it we need so many ships, aircraft, strategic missiles and medium-range missiles, nuclear warheads, space reconnaissance and communications systems. For now, the United States sees the main threat in Russia, but in the long term, it is, of course, China.

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